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ABSTRACT
Aeronautical decision-making (ADM) is defined by the FAA (1991) as ‘a systematic approach to the
mental process used by aircraft pilots to consistently determine the best course of action in response to
a given set of circumstances’. Jensen and Benel (1977) found that decision errors contributed to 35%
of all nonfatal and 52% of all fatal general aviation accidents in the United States. Diehl (1991)
proposed that decision errors contributed to 56% of airline accidents and 53% of military accidents.
This research analyzes 51 accident reports obtained from ROC Aviation Safety Council (ASC)
published between 1999 and 2008. Each accident report was independently analyzed using the Human
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework (Weigmann and Shappell, 2003). The
presence or the absence of each HFACS category was evaluated from the narrative of each accident
report. Statistical relationships linking fallible decisions in upper management were found to directly
affect supervisory practices, thereby creating the psychological preconditions for unsafe acts and hence
indirectly impairing the performance of pilots’ decision-making. It was observed that 68% of accidents
in this sample included a decision error. The results show clearly defined, statistically-described paths
with pre-cursors to decision errors at both the immediately adjacent and also higher levels in the
organization. This study provides an understanding, based upon empirical evidence, of how actions
and decisions at higher managerial levels in the operation of commercial aircraft result in decision
errors on the flight deck and subsequent accidents. To reduce the accident rate resulting from
decision errors in flight operations the ‘paths to failure’ relating to these organizational and human
factors issues must be addressed.
Keywords: Accident Prevention, Aeronautical Decision-making, Human Error, Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System
INTRODUCTION
Flying a high-technology aircraft is not only an issue of skilled psychomotor performance but also of
real-time decision-making involving situation awareness, choice amongst alternatives and assessment
of risk within a limited-time frame (Endsley, 1993 & 1997; Prince & Salas, 1993). Pilots must
perform a wide array of tasks in addition to simply getting the aircraft from one point to another. As a
result, pilots must learn to make decisions and develop judgments related to mission performance in
addition to making those decisions related directly to flying the aircraft. Aeronautical decision-making
(ADM) has traditionally been viewed as an intrinsic quality or as a by-product of flying experience
(Buch & Diehl, 1984).
Jensen and Benel (1977) found that decision errors contributed to 35% of all nonfatal and 52% of all
fatal general aviation accidents in the United States between 1970 and 1974. Furthermore, Diehl
(1991) proposed that decision errors contributed to 56% of airline accidents and 53% of military
accidents. More recent studies (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2004) have found decision errors contributed
to 45% of accidents in the USAF and 55% in the US Navy.
O’Hare (2003) reviewed aeronautical decision-making and came to the conclusion that ‘it is difficult to
think of any single topic that is more central to the question of effective human performance in aviation
than that of decision-making’. Current FAA regulations require that decision-making is taught as part
of the pilot-training curriculum (FAA, DOT 61.125), however, little guidance is provided as to how
that might be accomplished, and none is given as to how it might be assesses outside of the practical
test. Endsley (1997) suggested the key to effective decision-making rests in correctly understanding
the situation. Pilots’ situation awareness and risk management are key parts of the aeronautical
decision-making process. Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon (1980) advised that problem-solving
studies show fundamental differences between novices and experts in how problems are interpreted,
what strategies are devised, what information is used, expert’s memory for critical information, and the
speed and accuracy of problem solving. Experienced decision makers consider a large number of
cues in building situation assessments, and under certain specific circumstances may take actions that
appear contrary to those prescribed by checklist. Experts can see underlying causes and have more
complex models of the problem space than novices.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Aeronautical decision-making is defined by the FAA (1991) as ‘a systematic approach to the mental
process used by aircraft pilots to consistently determine the best course of action in response to a given
set of circumstances’ (Hunter, 2003). Jensen (1997) defined pilot judgment as ‘the mental process
that pilots use in making decision’. Both definitions implicitly include both process and outcome.
Fischer, Orasanu, & Wich (1995) suggested that risk and time pressure are situational variables that
constrain the decision process, as risk and time pressure may call for an immediate response whether or
not the problem was fully understood. Lower risk levels and fewer time constraints, in contrast,
permit additional diagnostic actions to be undertaken or the deliberation of options. Jensen, Guilke &
Tigner (1997) suggested that risk management should be a key part of the decision-making process.
Risk assessment feeds into decision making in two ways: during the assessment of the precipitating
threats and in evaluating potential courses of action. Janis and Mann (1977) proposed that a good
decision-making process is one in which the decision maker successfully accomplishes the collection
of information about a wide range of alternatives, carefully assessed the risks and benefits of each
course of action, and prepares contingency plans for dealing with known risks.
The processes of decision-making center around two elements; situation assessment, which is used as a
pre-cursor to generate one (or more) plausible courses of action and mental simulation to evaluate those
courses of action for risk management purposes. However, only if a pilot recognizes there is
sufficient time for making wide-ranging considerations will s/he evaluate the dominant response option
by conducting a mental simulation to see if it is likely to work. If there is not adequate time, the pilot
will tend to implement the course of action that experience (if any) dictates is the most likely to be
successful. Klein (1993) found that whereas experts used a recognition-primed or perception-based
decision process to retrieve a single likely option, novices were more likely to use an analytical
approach, systematically comparing multiple options. It was also found that experience affects the
processes of decision-making by improving the accuracy of situation assessment, increasing the
subsequent quality of the courses of action considered and enabling the decision maker to construct a
mental simulation. Situation assessment is a fundamental precursor to situation awareness, which is
itself the precursor for all aspects of decision-making (Nobel, 1993; Prince & Salas, 1997). In a
dynamic tactical environment, effective decision-making is highly dependent on situation awareness
(Endsley & Bolstad, 1994).
Automated aids on the flight deck are designed specifically to decrease pilots’ workload by performing
many complex tasks, not only including information processing, system monitoring, diagnosis and
prediction, but also controlling the aircraft itself. Flight management systems (FMS) are designed not
only to keep the aircraft on course, but also to manage many aspects of the flight task, such as
calculating fuel-efficient routes, navigation or detecting and diagnosing system malfunctions. An
inevitable facet of this high level of automation is that it has changed the way pilots perform tasks and
make decisions. However, the use of a high degree of automation also decreases the likelihood that
decision makers will make the cognitive effort to process all the available information in cognitively
complex ways. Parasuraman and Riley (1997) described this tendency toward over-reliance as
‘automation misuse’. In addition, automation can increase the probability that decision makers will
terminate the situation assessment process prematurely when prompted to take a certain course of
action by the automated aids. Experimental evidence of automation-induced commission errors was
produced during full-mission simulations in the NASA Ames Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator
(Mosier, Skitka, Heers and Burdick, 1998). Automation commission errors are errors made when
decision makers inappropriately follow automated information or directives (e.g. when other
information in the environment contradicts or is inconsistent with the automated cue). These have
recently begun surfacing as unintentional by-products of the use of highly automated systems.
For over 30 years the importance of aeronautical decision-making has been recognized as critical to the
safe operation of aircraft. Decision-making is a complex cognitive process and is affected by
situational and environmental conditions (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). Orasanu and Connolly
(1993) have suggested that much decision-making occurs in an organizational context, and that the
organization influences decisions directly by stipulating standard operating procedures, and indirectly,
through the organization’s norms and culture. Maurino et al. (1995) suggested that it is important to
understand how decisions made by people at the sharp-end (pilots) are influenced by the actions of the
people at the blunt-end of their operating worlds (i.e. the higher managerial levels in their
organizations). However, there is little empirical work formally describing the relationship between
organizational structures, psychological pre-cursors of accidents and the actual errors committed by
pilots. Dekker (2001) proposed that human errors are systematically connected to features of peoples’
tools and tasks, and as acknowledged more recently, their operational and organizational environment.
Latent failures are spawned in the upper management levels of organizations which may be related to
manufacturing, regulation and/or other aspects of management. As Reason (1997) noted, complex
systems such as airlines are designed, operated, maintained and managed by human beings. As a
result it is not surprising that human decisions and actions are implicated in most accidents.
This research utilizes the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System - HFACS (Shappell and
Weigmann, 2001; Weigmann and Shappell, 2003) `HFACS was developed from Reason’s
organizationally based model of human error (Reason, 1990, 1997). In this model active failures
(errors) of front-line operators (in this case pilots) combine with latent failures lying dormant in the
system to breach its defenses. These latent failures are spawned in the upper levels of the
organization and are related to management and regulatory structures.
HFACS addresses human errors and the factors underpinning them at four levels. Level 1 (unsafe
acts of operators - active failures) is concerned with the behaviors of the flight crew on the flight deck
that contribute directly to the accident. Failures at this level are further classified into two
sub-categories; errors and violations. Errors fall into three basic error types (skill-based, decision, and
perceptual). Violations, however, are instances of the willful disregard of rules, which subsequently
result in an accident. Level 2 (preconditions for unsafe acts - latent/active failures) addresses the
psychological pre-cursors to the active failures at level 1, such as the substandard conditions of the
operators and the operating environment which predispose them to making an error. Level 3 (unsafe
supervision - latent failures) traces the causal chain of events producing the unsafe acts up to the level
of the front-line supervisors. Level 4 (organizational influences - latent failures) describes the
contributions of fallible decisions in upper levels of management that directly affect supervisory
practices, as well as the conditions and actions of front-line operators. Higher levels in the HFACS
framework are hypothesized to affects lower organizational levels.
This study analyses accidents occurring to civil aircraft in the ROC using the HFACS framework to
establish how, both directly and indirectly actions and decisions at higher managerial levels in the
operation of commercial aircraft result in decision errors on the flight deck (and subsequently
accidents).
METHOD
Data: The reports for aviation accidents occurring between 1999 and 2008 were obtained from ROC
Aviation Safety Council. A total of 51 accidents occurred and had been subject to complete
investigations within this period. There were 24 different types of aircraft involved in the accidents
analyzed, including commercial jets airliners (Airbus A300, A320 and A330; Boeing B737 and B747;
McDonnell-Douglas MD11, MD82, MD83 and MD90): private jets (Bombardier BD700): turbo-prop
powered aircraft (ATR 72-200; De Havilland Canada DASH-8-300, Fokker 50) and commercial
helicopters (Bell UH-1H, 206 and 430; Boeing 234; Eurocopter BK117). Full copies of all these
accident reports may be found on the ROC Aviation Safety Council web site
(http://www.asc.gov.tw/asc_en/accident_list_1.asp).
Classification framework: The version of the HFACS framework described in Wiegmann and Shappell
(2003) was utilized in this study. Level-1 of the HFACS categorizes events under the headings of
‘unsafe acts of operators’ that can lead to an accident. This comprises four sub-categories of ‘decision
errors’; ‘skill-based errors’; ‘perceptual errors’ and ‘violations’. Level-2 of HFACS is concerned with
‘preconditions for unsafe acts’. This has seven sub-categories within it: ‘adverse mental states’;
‘adverse physiological states’; ‘physical/mental limitations’; ‘crew resource management’; ‘personal
readiness’; ‘physical environment’, and ‘technological environment’. Level-3 of HFACS is concerned
with ‘unsafe supervision’ which includes the four categories: ‘inadequate supervision’; ‘planned
inappropriate operation’; ‘failure to correct known problem’, and ‘supervisory violation’. Level-4, the
highest level in the framework is labeled ‘organizational influences’ and comprises of three
sub-categories: ‘resource management’; ‘organizational climate’ and ‘organizational process’.
Research Design: Two aviation human factors specialists coded each accident report independently.
The analysts had previously been trained together on the use of the analysis and categorization
framework to ensure that they achieved a detailed and accurate understanding of it. This training
consisted of three half-day modules delivered by an aviation psychologist. The training syllabus
included an introduction to the HFACS framework; explanation of the definitions of the four different
levels of HFACS; and a further detailed description of the content of the eighteen individual HFACS
categories. Prior to undertaking the present study these analysts also undertook the analysis a total of
523 accident reports (Li and Harris, 2006, 2008). The presence (coded 1) or absence (coded 0) of
each HFACS category was evaluated from the narrative of each accident report. Each HFACS
category was counted a maximum of only once per accident, thus this count acted simply as an
indicator of the presence or absence of each of the 18 categories within a given accident. Where there
were discrepancies in the categorization of an accident, the raters convened and resolved their
observations.
Statistical Analysis: Chi-square (2) analyses of the cross-tabulations to measure the statistical strength
of association between the categories in the higher and lower levels of the HFACS were used. As the
2 test is a simple test of association these analyses were supplemented with further analyses using
Goodman and Kruskal’s Tau (τ) which was used to calculate the proportional reduction in error (PRE).
Tau (τ) has the advantage of being a directional statistic. The lower level category of decision error in
the HFACS was designated as being dependent upon the categories at the higher levels in the
framework, which is congruent with the theoretical assumptions underlying HFACS. The value for
Tau (τ) indicates the strength of the relationship, with the higher levels in the HFACS being deemed to
influence (cause) changes at the lower organizational levels, thus going beyond what may be deemed a
simple test of co-occurrence between categories. Furthermore, odds ratios were calculated to provide
an estimate of the likelihood of the presence of a contributory factor in one HFACS category being
associated concomitantly with the presence of a factor in another category. However, it must be noted
that as odds ratios are an asymmetric measure they are only really theoretically meaningful when
associated with a non-zero value for Tau. From a theoretical standpoint, lower levels in the HFACS
cannot adversely affect higher levels. Finally, the inter-rater reliabilities were assessed using Cohen’s
Kappa and the percentage rate of agreement to indicate the reliability between raters.
RESULTS
Sample Characteristics
In total, 321 instances of human error, describing the underlying causal factors in the 51 accidents,
were recorded using the HFACS framework (Table 1). It must be noted in the following analyses that
the percentages quoted refer to the percentage of times that an HFACS category was implicated in the
sequence of events leading up to an accident. However, in most instances many more than just a
single factor was implicated in an accident sequence, hence the percentages quoted sum to more than
100% across the results section as a whole. ‘Decision errors’ were involved in 35 of the accidents
(68.6%) and was the most frequent category in HFACS framework. Initial results found that acts at
the level of ‘unsafe acts of operators’ (level 1) were involved in 109 (33.9%) instances; the
‘preconditions for unsafe acts’ level (level 2) was as a causal factor in 81 (25.2%) instances; the ‘unsafe
supervision’ level (level 3) was involved in 74 (23.1%) instances, and the ‘organizational influences’
level in the HFACS model (level 4) was involved as a factor in 57 (17.7 %) instances.
Inter-rater reliability
Prior to the resolution of discrepancies in coding between the raters, the inter-rater reliabilities,
calculated on a category-by-category, basis were assessed using Cohen’s Kappa. There were 10
categories where the Kappa value was in excess of 0.40, which is regarded as being acceptable (Landis
and Koch, 1977). For the remainder of the categories, though, the Kappa value failed to achieve this
level. Below 0.40 is regarded as a poor level of inter-rater reliability. However, Cohen’s Kappa has
several weaknesses as an index of inter-rater reliability. Low observed frequencies can distort Kappa
values, deflating its value where there is actually a very high level of agreement. Cohen’s Kappa
becomes unreliable when the vast majority of observations fall into just one of the categories and there
is also a high percentage of agreement between raters in this category. In such a case Cohen’s Kappa
will be low as the statistic is based upon expected probabilities calculated from the marginal observed
totals. Kappa does not take in account raters’ sensitivity and specificity and becomes unreliable when
raters’ agreement is either very small or very high (Huddlestone, 2003). As a result, inter-rater
reliabilities were also calculated as a simple percentage rate of agreement. These showed reliability
figures of between 56.9% and 96.1%, indicating acceptable reliability between the raters (Table 1).
Decision-error had a Kappa value of 0.52 and a 80.4% percentage rate of agreement for inter-rater
reliability.
Table 1 Frequency, Percentage, Rank and Inter-rater Reliabilities of each HFACS category for all 51
accidents between 1999 and 2008.
* Note that the percentages in the table will not equal 100%, because in many cases more than
one causal factor was associated with the accident
HFACS Category
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
R
an
k
C
oh
en
’s
K
ap
pa
In
te
r-
ra
te
r
R
el
ia
bi
lit
y
(p
er
ce
nt
ag
e
A
gr
ee
m
en
t)
Level-4,
Organizational
Influences
Organizational process 25 49.0 6 .415** 70.6％
Organizational climate 6 11.8 16 .457** 86.3％
Resource management 26 51.0 5 .113 56.9％
Level-3,
Unsafe
Supervision
Supervisory violation 24 47.1 7 .295* 64.7％
Failed correct a known problem 8 15.7 14 .287* 70.6％
Planned inappropriate operations 9 17.6 12 .316** 70.6％
Inadequate supervision 33 64.4 2 .261* 66.7％
Level-2,
Preconditions for
Unsafe Acts
Technology environment 12 23.5 11 .105 70.6％
Physical environment 24 47.1 7 .606*** 80.4％
Personal readiness 7 13.7 15 .441*** 80.4％
Crew resource management 24 47.1 7 .499*** 74.5％
Physical/mental limitation 3 5.9 17 .086 80.4％
Adverse physiological states 2 3.9 18 .480*** 96.1％
Adverse mental states 9 17.6 12 .225 70.6％
Level-1,
Unsafe Acts of
Operators
Violations 30 58.8 3 .485*** 76.5％
Perceptual errors 14 27.5 10 .549*** 78.4％
Skilled-based errors 30 58.8 3 .493*** 76.5％
Decision errors 35 68.6 1 .529*** 80.4％
Indirect Paths of Association between Latent Failures and Active Failures
Analysis of the strength of association between categories at HFACS level-4 ‘organizational
influences’ versus level-3 ‘unsafe supervision’ indicated that of a possible 12 relationships, three pairs
of associations were significant (p<0.05). ‘Organizational process’ was significantly associated with
‘inadequate supervision’; ‘planned inappropriate operations’; and ‘supervisory violations’ at level-3.
These statistically significant relationships are summarized in Table 2. There were several tests of
association performed between categories at HFACS level-4 and 3 very with high odds ratios, all of
which are associated with non-zero values for Tau (τ).  Inadequate supervision was over twenty-seven 
times more likely to occur when there were organizational level issues associated with poor
‘organizational process’. The strength of association between categories at level-3 ‘unsafe
supervision’ versus level-2 ‘pre-conditions for unsafe acts’ indicated that of a possible 28 relationships,
six pairs of associations were significant (p<0.05). These were ‘inadequate supervision’ at level-3
versus ‘CRM’; ‘adverse mental states’; and ‘personal readiness’ at level-2; ‘planned inappropriate
operations’ with the ‘physical environment’ and ‘CRM’; and ‘supervisory violation’ versus ‘personal
readiness’. Of these comparisons it can be seen that poor ‘personal readiness’ was over eleven times
more likely to occur in the presence of ‘inadequate supervision’ at the higher level. Similarly, poor
CRM was over nine times more likely to occur in the presence of ‘inadequate supervision’ at the higher
level.
Table 2 Significant chi-square test of association (p<0.05), associated values for Goodman and
Kruskal’s Tau (τ) and odds ratio for the analysis of upper level and adjacent downward level
categories in the HFACS framework
Direct Path of Association between Upper Categories and Decision errors
Analysis of the strength of the direct association between categories at level-4 (organizational
influences); level-3 (unsafe supervision) and level-2 (pre-conditions for unsafe acts) versus ‘decision
errors’ at level-1 (unsafe acts of operators) indicated that of a possible 14 relationships, nine pairs of
associations were significant. The following categories, ‘organizational process’ (level-4); ‘inadequate
supervision’; ‘planned inappropriate operations’; and ‘supervisory violations’ (level-3); ‘adverse
Significant association between upper level and adjacent downward level
categories in the HFACS framework
Chi-square
τ 
Odds
ratio
Value p
HFACS Level 4 association with Level 3 categories
Organizational process * supervisory violation 15.006 .000 .294 13.630
Organizational process * planned inadequate operations 14.644 .000 .287 26.308
Organizational process * inadequate supervision 22.187 .000 .435 27.067
HFACS Level 3 association with Level 2 categories
Supervisory violation * personal readiness 4.249 .039 .083 3.850
Planned inadequate operations * physical environment 10.311 .001 .202 7.333
P l a n n e d i n a d e q u a t e o p e r a t i o n s * c r e w r e s o u r c e m a n a g e m e n t 9.218 .002 .181 9.600
Inadequate supervision * personal readiness 6.800 .009 .133 11.200
Inadequate supervision * crew resource management 9.659 .002 .189 7.071
Inadequate supervision * adverse mental states 4.554 .033 .089 5.520
mental states’; ‘physical/mental limitations’; ‘crew resource management’; ‘personal readiness’; and
‘physical environment’ (level-2) were all significantly associated with ‘decision errors’ at level-1. Of
these comparisons it can be seen that ‘decision errors’ was over fifteen times more likely to occur in the
presence of poor ‘CRM’ practices, over thirteen times more likely to occur in the presence of ‘planned
inappropriate operations’, and over four times more likely to occur in the presence of ‘organizational
process’ (Table 3).
Table 3 Significant chi-square tests of association (p<0.05), associated values for Goodman and
Kruskal’s Tau (τ), and odds ratios for the analysis of categories at upper level versus
‘decision errors’ at level-1 in the HFACS framework
DISCUSSION
The majority of HFACS categories had large enough numbers of instances of occurrence in the data set
to allow reasonable confidence in the pattern of results obtained. It can be seen from the data
presented in Table 1 that ‘decision errors’ had the highest percentage (68.6%) of involvement in
accidents among 18 categories. The findings are in accord with previous research conducted by
Jensen and Benel (1977), Diehl (1991) and Li and Harris (2006 & 2008). All categories also
exhibited acceptable levels of inter-rater reliability, as assessed using percentage agreement. These
values were as good as (or in excess of) the levels reported in previous studies (e.g. Weigmann and
Shappell, 2003; Gaur, 2005; Li and Harris, 2005 & 2008).
Reason (1990, 1997) proposed that latent conditions promoting unsafe acts are inevitably present in all
systems. The original decision on how to allocate resources made at the highest levels in the
organization may originally have been based on sound commercial arguments but such inequities can
create safety problems in other, operational parts of the system. The analyses in this paper clearly
show that inadequacies at HFACS level-4 ‘organizational influences’ had associations with further
Significant association between categories at upper level versus
decision errors
Chi-square
τ 
Odds
ratio
Value p
HFACS Level 4 association with ‘decision errors’
Organizational process * decision error 6.032 .014 .118 4.806
HFACS Level 3 association with ‘decision errors’
Supervisory violation * decision error 3.878 .049 .076 3.669
Planned inadequate operations * decision error 8.328 .004 .163 13.772
Inadequate supervision * decision error 12.602 .000 .247 10.714
HFACS Level 2 association with ‘decision errors’
physical environment * decision error 5.088 .024 .100 4.813
personal readiness * decision error 8.041 .005 .158 NC
crew resource management * decision error 15.826 .000 .310 15.714
Physical and mental limitation * decision error 4.135 .042 .081 NC
adverse mental states * decision error 5.262 .022 .103 8.864
inadequacies at HFACS level-3 ‘unsafe supervision’ (see Table 2 and Figure 1). The category of
‘organizational process’ is a particularly important factor at this highest organizational level. Poor
‘organizational processes’ were associated with ‘inadequate supervision’; ‘planned inappropriate
operations’; and ‘supervisory violations’ at the level of ‘unsafe supervision’ and hence were ultimately
at the root of decision errors resulting in accidents. Both Reason (1990) and Wiegmann and Shappell
(2003) hypothesized that inappropriate decision-making by upper-level management can adversely
influence the personnel and practices at the supervisory level, which in turn affects the psychological
pre-conditions and hence the subsequent actions of the front-line operators. This study provides
statistical support for this hypothesized relationship. A similar pattern of results was also found in the
analysis of 523 ROC air force accidents previously reported by Li and Harris (2006, 2007). Moreover,
this research proposes that not only categories at level-2 have direct influenced on pilots’
decision-making, but also categories at HFACS level-4 ‘organizational influences’ and level-3 ‘unsafe
supervision’ are directly related to pilots’ decision-making at level-1 (Figure 1).
Figure 1 reveals that the category of ‘organizational process’ at level-4 was the key factor in HFACS
framework. ‘Organizational process’ refers to corporate decisions and rules that govern the everyday
activities within an organization, including the establishment of standard operating procedures and
Figure 1 Paths between categories at the four levels in the HFACS framework showing
the significant associations with Decision-error using Chi-square (2) and
Goodman and Kruskal’s Tau (τ) for the data derived from 51 accidents reports
by ASC between 1999 and 2008.
Level 4:
Organizational
influences
Level 3:
Unsafe
Supervision
Level 2:
Preconditions
for unsafe
acts
Level 1:
Unsafe acts
Resource
management
Organizational
Climate
Organizational
processes
Inadequate
supervision
Planned inappropriate
operations
Supervisory
violation
Failed to correct a
known problem
Adverse
Mental state
Technology
Environme
nt
Physical
Environment
Personal
Readiness
Crew
resource
managemen
t
Physical
/mental
limitation
Adverse
physical
state state
Decision errors Violation (routine &
Exceptional)
Perceptual errorsSkilled-based
errors
formal methods for maintaining checks and balances between the workforce and management.
Inappropriate ‘Organizational process’ practices particularly influenced pilots’ decision-making at
level-1 and ‘inadequate supervision’; ‘planned inappropriate operations’; and ‘supervisory violations’
at level-3. The role of supervisors is to provide their personnel with the facilities and capability to
succeed and to ensure the job is done safely and efficiently. The category of ‘inadequate supervision’
refers to a supervisor’s failure to provide professional guidance, a failure to provide proper training,
failure to track the qualifications, a lack of accountability and loss supervisory situational awareness.
‘Planned inappropriate operation’ was created as a category to account for failures such as poor crew
pairing, a failure to provide adequate briefing time, making assessments where risk outweighed benefit,
and excessive workload. ‘Supervisory violations’ as a category is reserved for those instances when
existing rules and regulations are willfully disregarded by supervisors, such as authorizing an
unqualified crew for flight, a failure to enforce rules and regulations, violations of procedures, and/or
inadequate documentation. Moreover, all of these three categories at level-3 not only have a direct
influence on pilots’ decision-making, but also have significant associations with the categories of
‘adverse mental states’; ‘physical/mental limitations’; ‘CRM’; ‘personal readiness’; and the ‘physical
environment’ at level-2. Finally, all of these five categories at level-2 have a direct relationship with
pilots’ decision errors. The category of ‘adverse mental states’ was created to account for mental
conditions that affect performance, such as loss of situational awareness, task fixation, distraction and
mental fatigue due to stress. ‘Physical/mental limitations’ refers to those instances when operational
requirements exceed the capabilities of the individual at the controls, such as visual limitations, having
insufficient reaction time, information overload, incompatible physical capabilities and a lack of
aptitude to fly. ‘CRM’ was created to account for occurrences of poor coordination among personnel,
such as coordination between and within the aircraft, as well as with ATC, maintenance, or other
support personnel. ‘Personal readiness’ refers to when individuals fail to prepare physically or mentally
for duty. A breakdown in ‘personal readiness’ includes failures to adhere to crew rest requirements,
overexertion when off-duty, self-medicating and inadequate training. ‘Physical environment’ refers to
both the operational environment and the ambient environment, such as weather, altitude, terrain,
lighting, vibration and toxins on the flight deck.
Reason (1990) suggested that human behavior is governed by the interplay between psychological and
situational factors. The findings from this study show that five categories at level-2 (latent/active
failures), ‘adverse mental states’; ‘physical/mental limitations’; ‘crew resource management’; ‘personal
readiness’; and ‘physical environment’ had a strong statistical relationships with the active failures of
pilots, ‘decision errors’ at level-1 (see Table 3 & Figure 1). Reason (1990, 1997) has suggested that
there is a ‘many to one’ mapping of the psychological precursors of unsafe acts to the actual errors
themselves, making it difficult to predict which actual errors will occur as a result of which
preconditions. The results of this study using the HFACS framework support this assertion. There
are statistically significant associations between causal factors at the higher organizational levels,
psychological contributory factors and ultimately the decision errors made by pilots (see Figure 1). It
can even be suggested that poor organizational processes at the highest levels result in poor supervisory
oversight, which itself can lead to inappropriate preconditions for unsafe acts, resulting in making
inappropriate decisions during flight operations. However, some care needs to be taken when
interpreting the statistical relationships presented in Figure 1. In a few categories the frequency
counts are moderately small. Furthermore, the frequency counts within categories were all derived
from accidents. It is unknown (and unknowable) how often instances within the various HFACS
categories have occurred in day-to-day operations that have not resulted in an accident. Thus, the
relationships between HFACS levels and categories should not be interpreted outside the accident
causal sequence. Nevertheless, the results of this study of civil aviation accidents occurring in the
ROC show a remarkable similarity to the study of military accidents conducted in the air force of the
same country.
This research shows a strong direct association between categories at level-4 and level-3 to decision
errors at level-1. The results of this study show further developments in the theory underpinning
HFACS. Wiegmann & Shappell (2003) proposed ‘each higher level in framework will directly affect
the events in lower level’. This research demonstrates that this relationship extends beyond the
immediately adjacent levels in the analytical framework. The causal factors underlying accidents
relevant to decision errors may be underestimated or even misunderstood, as there are potentially many
accidents caused by inadequate decision making attributed to violations（Li and Harris, 2008. ‘Decision
making’ is a complex cognitive process which is not only affected by physical factors, mental factors,
flying conditions and the technical environment, but is also affected by organizational management and
supervisory practices. However, ‘decision making’ is like any other flying skill in that it can be trained
to promote flight safety (Jensen & Hunter, 2002; Klein, 1993; Prince & Salas, 1997). Therefore, the
question becomes ‘how to design the relevant training program’ to enhance the quality of pilot’s
decision making.
CONCLUSIONS
Aeronautical knowledge, skill, and judgment have always been regarded as the three basic faculties that
pilots must possess. Judgment has usually been considered to be a trait that good pilots innately
possess (Buch & Diehl, 1984) however improved accidents-investigation technology, such as cockpit
voice recorders, along with a more systematic review of accident statistics, has produced a growing
realization of the significance of pilots’ decision errors in aviation mishaps (Diehl, 1991; Li and Harris,
2006, 2007 & 2008). The introduction of new technology has motivated the military and airlines to
put greater emphasis on the role of the pilot as a manager and decision maker. Thus, attempts are
being made to improve decision skills and to better understand the underlying causes of judgment
errors. However, the study of ‘decision making’ in training programs still remains lacking in relevant
research. This study provides an understanding, based upon empirical evidence, of how actions and
decisions at higher managerial levels in the operation of commercial aircraft result in decision errors on
the flight deck and subsequent accidents. The results show clearly defined, statistically-described paths
that relate errors at level-1 (the operational level) with inadequacies at both the immediately adjacent
and also higher organizational levels. This research draws a clear picture that supports Reason’s
(1990) model of active failures resulting from latent conditions in the organization. To reduce the
accident rate resulting from decision errors these ‘paths to failure’ must be addressed.
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